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THE EU͛S PA‘TICIPATION IN THE GLOBAL 
LEGAL O‘DE‘ AS A POSTNATIONAL 
DEMOC‘ACY: MANIFESTATIONS OF 
SOVE‘EIGNTY  
Summary 
Sovereignty is arguably neither popular nor conventional nor does it transpose itself into discourses of rule-making beyond 
the Nation State. For some, to speak of sovereignty in the context of global governance leads to bewildering identification 
of a ͚gloďal soǀeƌeigŶ͛. The ŵulti-directional nature of the global reach and effects of EU law has been shown in this 
account to comprise boundaries and competences extensions to various degrees. It is argued to constitute manifestations 
of sovereignty, with spatial, aĐtioŶ aŶd tƌaŶsďouŶdaƌǇ diŵeŶsioŶs to it that ƌeƋuiƌe ͚uŶpaĐkiŶg͛. This paper argues that 
postnational rule-making practices conducted by the EU may usefully be captured by sovereignty, as an over-arching 
framework beyond an analysis for power, influence and interactions between legal orders. Much scholarship on sovereignty 
and the EU has been developed prior to more recent invocations in the EU treaties to evolve as a postnational democracy. 
Participation by the EU in the global legal order is a multi-faceted construct but is argued here to be rooted in an 
understanding of the EU as an actor, i.e. what it is and what it does.  Legal scholarship appears to place a high premium on 
the ability of the EU to participate externally as an actor, seamlessly, coherently and with consistency. Accordingly, as has 
been argued here, the enabling character of sovereignty at the postnational level appears insufficiently studied. The 
physical and metaphysical space of EU rules is argued here to require more nuancing, method and study as to its 
components. There are as many methodological as substantive challenges to such a thesis, which this text has sought to 
address as part of a research agenda. Legal texts providing for active participation in the global legal order can be most 
imperfect even in integrated spheres of action. What is more pressing to consider is the merger of sovereignty, territoriality 
and jurisdiction in a global world as an emerging matter for EU law.  
 
 
 
Introduction 
How the EU impacts, effects, participates and interacts in and with the global legal order presents 
many challenges for orthodoxy. One of the greatest challenges that it presents as a leading 
postnational democracy is argued here to be for our understanding of sovereignty. Accounts which 
depict or describe the EU as a postnational actor do not tend to invoke sovereignty, neither as a 
construct nor as a method or process thereof. Instead, such accounts are more concerned with the 
place within breakdowns of orthodoxy conceived broadly, the shortcomings of postnational 
democracy and its institutional components and rule-making practices. And there are many accounts 
in legal scholarship as to how the EU has evolved as an international actor, particularly after its last 
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Treaty revision process.
1
 “uĐh aĐĐouŶts suggest that the EU plaǇs aŶ ͚aĐtiǀe ƌole iŶ shapiŶg the 
iŶteƌŶatioŶal oƌdeƌ͛,2 in terms of its objectives and practices and many policies, but it is similarly not 
a discourse mediated through sovereignty.  The EU͛s paƌticipation in the global legal order is argued 
to show ŵaŶifestatioŶs of ͚late soǀeƌeigŶtǇ͛, oƌ at least ďe atǇpiĐal of postŶatioŶal soǀeƌeigŶtǇ.3 It 
has spatial, action and transboundary dimensions to it that require unpacking. Sovereignty is 
arguably neither popular nor conventional nor does it transpose itself into discourses of rule-making 
beyond the Nation State. For some, to speak of sovereignty in the context of global governance leads 
to ďeǁildeƌiŶg ideŶtifiĐatioŶ of a ͚gloďal soǀeƌeigŶ͛. InternatioŶal ƌelatioŶs ͚ĐoŶstƌuĐtiǀists͛ 
emphasise that sovereignty in its internal and external facets is a socially-constructed trait.
4
 They are 
social facts that are usually produced and reproduced through the practices of States. Sovereignty 
Đoŵes fƌoŵ ͚soŵe plaĐe͛ aŶd is heaǀilǇ iŶflueŶĐed ďǇ otheƌ soĐial Ŷoƌŵs aŶd pƌaĐtiĐes. OŶe of the 
ŵost appealiŶg aŶd useful featuƌes of soǀeƌeigŶtǇ foƌ uŶdeƌstaŶdiŶg the EU͛s aĐtioŶs iŶ the ǁoƌld is 
that the EU, similar to sovereignty itself, has both an internal and external dimension.  
As Keohane states, a means to interpret the essence of sovereignty is to view it as a thesis about 
norms of sovereignty being possibly violated.
5
 Social norms are conventionally depicted as shared 
                                                          
1
 See Steven Blockmans, Bart van Vooren, and Jan Wouters (eds.), The Legal Dimension of Global Governance: 
What Role for the EU? (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012). 
2
 Eg Dimitry Kochenov and Fabian Amtenbrink (eds.), The EU͛s ShapiŶg of the IŶteƌŶatioŶal Legal Oƌdeƌ 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014). 
3
 MaŶifestatioŶs: ͚An event, action, or object that clearly shows or embodies something abstract or 
theoƌetiĐal͛: <http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/manifestation> accessed 20 January 2015. 
4
 See John Searle, The Construction of Social Reality (New York: Free Press, 1995); John Gerard Ruggie, 
͚CoŶtiŶuitǇ aŶd TƌaŶsfoƌŵatioŶ iŶ the Woƌld PolitǇ: Toǁaƌd a Neoƌealist “ǇŶthesis͛ iŶ ‘oďeƌt KeohaŶe ;eds.Ϳ, 
Neorealism and Its Critics (Columbia University Press 1986); See Daǀid Lake, ͚The New Sovereignty in 
IŶteƌŶatioŶal ‘elatioŶs͛ ;ϮϬϬϯͿ ϱ ;ϯͿ International Studies Review 303. 
5
 I.e. drawn from Krasner (note 24), yielding hypocrisy when applied to Nation States, developing countries or 
ĐouŶtƌies at ǁaƌ oƌ ƌife ǁith iŶstaďilitǇ ‘oďeƌt KeohaŶe, ͚“tepheŶ KƌasŶeƌ: “uďǀeƌsiǀe ‘ealist͛ ;ϮϬϭϬͿ AP“A ϮϬϭϬ 
Annual Meeting Paper. Available at SSRN: <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1643351> accessed 20 January 2015; 
‘oďeƌt KeohaŶe, ͚IƌoŶies of “oǀeƌeigŶtǇ: The EuƌopeaŶ UŶioŶ aŶd the UŶited “tates͛ ;ϮϬϬϮͿ ϰϮ Journal of 
Common Market Studies 743; see Stephen D Krasner, Sovereignty. Organised Hypocrisy (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1999). 
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expectations on the part of a group about appropriate behaviour.
6
 In the Nation State context, when 
norms are espoused they may not make a difference but they are important sources of behaviour in 
world politics. Norms do not per se determine behaviour but they exercise an impact. However, for 
norms to be relevant they must be advocated. At supranational level, i.e. as to a regional 
organisation, these terms carry a different force, as considered here in. Norm agency is usually 
intended to imply where States act as advocates, non-State organisations act as advocates and 
international organisations act as norm agents.
7
 The EU maybe said to be a rising but complex norm 
agent because of its porous openness to inter alia external and internal norms and their interaction 
onwards into EU rules. The active and developing component of this process has the appearance of a 
manifestation, as a tendency, an incremental process or development. Norms act as a focal point for 
decentralised networks of organisations and individuals and as a result, International organisations 
are major promoters of norms in world politics. This paper focusses upon one aspect of the 
theorisation of sovereignty which is the manner in which norms are promoted by the EU through its 
participation in the global legal order. 
 This paper argues that this participation may usefully be captured by sovereignty, as an over-arching 
framework beyond an analysis for power, influence and interactions between legal orders. It is 
argued that sovereignty comprises dynamic internal and external interfaces and that it captures the 
flexible, fluid but also pragmatic way in which the EU gradually asserts itself in the global legal order. 
AĐĐoƌdiŶglǇ, the aĐĐouŶt uŶpiĐks aŶd uŶƌaǀels ŵaŶifestatioŶs of the EU͛s eŵeƌgiŶg postnational 
sovereignty done through a consideration of social practice, active conduct and the space of and for 
EU rules and their boundaries. 
                                                          
6
 E.g. Martha Finnemore, National Interests in International Society (Cornell University Press 1996) 22. Contrast 
Katerina Linos in her recent book who argues that there is a body of evidence indicating that international 
norms are spreading within regions across the globe and causing radical policy shifts: The Democratic 
Foundations of Policy Diffusion: How Health, Family, and Employment Laws Spread Across Countries (Oxford 
University press, 2013). 
7
 See M. Finnemore and K. Sikkink, ͞IŶteƌŶatioŶal Noƌŵ DǇŶaŵiĐs aŶd PolitiĐal ChaŶge͟. IŶteƌŶatioŶal 
Organization 52 (1998) 887-917.  
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This paper explores in Section 1 the lexicon of the ͚postnational͛ as applied to the EU. Section II 
assesses the understandings and many paradoxes of sovereignty. Section III considers the 
exceptionalism of EU sovereignty, including EU sovereignty, as developed by Walker. Section IV 
considers what the EU participates towards the global legal orders and how it does this, in four sub-
seĐtioŶs, as to its ;ϭͿ goals, ;ϮͿ its soĐial pƌaĐtiĐes, ;ϯͿ the ͚spaĐe͛ of aŶd foƌ EU ƌules aŶd ;ϰͿ the 
construction of (trans)boundaries under EU law.   
By way of a preliminary overview, this paper outlines what is understood by the terŵ ͚postnational͛ 
as applied to the EU and its legal order in this account.  
 
I. The lexicon of the postnational 
The demise of the Nation State as a solitary actor and its increasing propensity to operate within 
transnational constructs is a fact of contemporary life. Nonetheless, it still remains the ultimate 
actor.
8 The teƌŵs suĐh as ͚postŶatioŶal laǁ͛ oƌ ͚postŶatioŶal deŵoĐƌaĐǇ͛ haǀe ďeeŶ deploǇed to 
depiĐt ͚the state of the “tate͛ as ŵuĐh as the decline of the boundaries of societal orthodoxy.9 Less 
so, the term is used more incidentally in respect of the rule-making or legal instruments resulting 
theƌefƌoŵ, iŶ the postŶatioŶal ͚spaĐe͛.10 Ostensibly, postnationalism implies that the performance of 
constitutionalism and politics is no longer configured around or constructed within the territorial 
strictures of the Nation State.
 
Postnationalism signifies the importance of the proliferation of new 
                                                          
8
 See, most famously, Saskia Sassen, Losing Control? Sovereignty in the Age of Globalization (Columbia 
University Press 1996); also Saskia Sassen, Territory, Authority, Rights: From Medieval to Global Assemblages 
(2nd edn, Princeton University Press 2008). 
9
 See Colin Crouch, Post-democracy (Polity Press, 2004); Jürgen Habermas, The Postnational Constellation: 
Political Essays (1
st
 ed. MIT Press 2001); Jürgen Habermas, The Crisis of the European Union: A Response (Polity 
Press, 2012); Deirdre Curtin, The European Union: A Postnational Democracy in search of a Political Philosophy 
(The Hague: Kluwer Law, 1997). 
10
 See Damian Chalmers, ͚Post-ŶatioŶalisŵ aŶd the Ƌuest foƌ ĐoŶstitutioŶal suďstitutes͛ (2000) 27 (1) Journal of 
Law and Society 178; Karl-HeiŶz Ladeuƌ, ͚The TheoƌǇ of Autopoiesis as an Approach to a Better Understanding 
of Postmodern Law From the  Hierarchy of Norms to the Heterarchy of Changing Patterns of Legal Inter-
ƌelatioŶships͛ EUI WoƌkiŶg Papeƌ Laǁ No ϵϵ/ϯ; Eƌik EƌikseŶ, ChƌistiaŶ Joeƌges  aŶd FloƌiaŶ ‘ödl ;eds.Ϳ, ͚Laǁ aŶd 
Democracy in the Post-NatioŶal  UŶioŶ͛ A‘ENA ‘epoƌt No ϭ/ϮϬϬϲ; Neil Walkeƌ, ͚PostŶatioŶal CoŶstitutioŶalisŵ 
aŶd PostŶatioŶal PuďliĐ Laǁ: A Tale of Tǁo Neologisŵs͛ ;ϮϬϭϮͿ ϯ Transnational Legal Theory 61.  
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forms of law and politics, interactions between legal orders and political disordering.
11 
 
Postnationalism is arguably less a study of single or specific instruments or policies and instead is 
probably more accurately a broader methodology to study shifts in norms, actors and processes.  
However, postnationalism has not resulted in any accepted normative idea of postŶatioŶal ͚laǁ͛ as a 
phenomenon, especially not in legal scholarship. Nor has it evolved with any express relationship to 
sovereignty as a construct, method or process of legal orders or ordering. At its height, the 
deployment of post-nationalism in legal sĐholaƌship has eǀeŶ ďeeŶ ĐƌitiƋued as ͚EU-ĐeŶtƌiĐ͛ aŶd 
͚Couƌt-ĐeŶtƌiĐ͛, theƌeďǇ laĐkiŶg ƌeleǀaŶĐe to aŶǇ legal oƌdeƌ oƌ field outside of the ĐoŶteǆt of the EU, 
constructed largely through judicialised understandings of conduct.
12
 Postnational conceptualisations 
of the EU are not perceived to have a broad reach precisely because, as some wryly note, there is no 
postnational world.
13
 Moreover, its inherent direction may become problematic. For example, can 
postnational legal orders such as the EU become post-postnational in the event of institutionalisation 
taking place between it and the US (for example in the Transatlantic Trade and Investment  
Partnership)?
14
 Postnationalism may be said to capture most accurately the aspirations of the last 
Treaty revision process of the EU. It was sought there to create an autonomous democratic life of the 
EU, legal personality, dispersed external executive power and a regularisation of its most sensitive 
field for Nation State sovereignty, its Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ). In this regard, to 
speak of the EU as a postnational democracy is more commonplace in scholarship.
15
 Postnational 
                                                          
11
 Damian Chalmers, ͚Post-nationalism and the quest foƌ ĐoŶstitutioŶal suďstitutes͛ (2000) 27 (1) Journal of Law 
and Society 178. 
12
 GƌegoƌǇ “haffeƌ, ͚A TƌaŶsŶatioŶal Take oŶ KƌisĐh͛s Pluƌalist PostŶatioŶal Laǁ͛ ;ϮϬϭϮͿ Ϯϯ;ϮͿ European Journal 
of International Law 565; Nico Krisch, Beyond Constituitonalism: The Pluralist Structure of Postnational Law 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011). 
13
 Ibid.  
14
 Established after the EU-US Summit in 2011, followed by an Interim Report on 19 June, 2012. See Final 
Report High Level Working Group on Jobs and Growth. 
<http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2013/february/tradoc_150519.pdf> accessed 20 January 2015. See 
Maƌija Baƌtl aŶd ElaiŶe FaheǇ, ͚A PostŶatioŶal MaƌketplaĐe: NegotiatiŶg the Transatlantic Trade and Investment 
PaƌtŶeƌship ;TTIPͿ͛ iŶ ElaiŶe FaheǇ aŶd Deiƌdƌe CuƌtiŶ ;eds.Ϳ, A Transatlantic Community of Law: Legal 
Perspectives on the Relationship between the EU and US legal orders (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2014). 
15
 See Deirdre Curtin, The European Union: A Postnational Democracy in search of a Political Philosophy (The 
Hague: Kluwer Law, 1997); Damian Chalmers, ͚Post-nationalism and the quest for constitutional 
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democracy has a heavy descriptive component in the EU treaties, expressly developed in the 
autonomous section on the deŵoĐƌatiĐ life of the EU. Its ͚pƌoŵise͛ is of sigŶifiĐaŶĐe to ŵaŶǇ.16 But 
this is not to reify the significance of the use of the postnational. The lexicon of the postnational is 
not necessarily a term of art and rather a broader one to understand the development of the EU. Yet 
it is not one which offers an account of the dynamics of power or the superstructure of hierarchy and 
authority.  What this account attempts to develop then is the usefulness of sovereignty for the 
depiction of the postnational as it applies to the EU.  
 
II. The ͚useful uselessŶess͛ of soǀereigŶty  
i. Overview 
Sovereignty is conducted within a rhetoric that is usually conducted either in terms of negativity, 
loss, breakdown and reference to the past,
17
 or in terms of positivity, which is constructive eg as to 
sovereignty in conflict,
18
 competitive sovereignty, mixed sovereignty or pooled sovereignty. In this 
way, it offers a parallel to post national rule-making in its emphasis upon disorder but also upon the 
space of postnational rule-making. The essential incoherence and even uselessness of sovereignty in 
contemporary legal scholarship is an omnipresent feature, be it in UK Constitutional law, 
supranational discourse or emerging polities.
19
 Its ability to confuse and cloud debate is one 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
suďstitutes͛ (2000) 27 (1) Journal of Law and Society 178. 
16
 AƌŵiŶ VaŶ BogdaŶdǇ, ͚The EuƌopeaŶ LessoŶ foƌ IŶteƌŶatioŶal DeŵoĐƌaĐǇ: The “igŶifiĐaŶĐe of AƌtiĐles ϵ-12 EU 
TƌeatǇ foƌ IŶteƌŶatioŶal OƌgaŶizatioŶs͛ ;ϮϬϭϮͿ Ϯϯ ;ϮͿ European Journal of International Law 315.  
17
 See Joschka FisĐheƌ, ͚Euƌope͛s “oǀeƌeigŶtǇ Cƌisis͛ <https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/europe-
s-sovereignty-crisis> accessed 20 January 2015.   
18
 “aŵaŶtha BessoŶ, ͚“oǀeƌeigŶtǇ iŶ CoŶfliĐt͛ ;ϮϬϬϰͿ ϴ;ϭϱͿ European Integration Online Papers 1. Available at 
SSRN: <http://ssrn.com/abstract=594942> accessed 20 January 2015.  
19
 Eg Hans Lindahl aŶd Beƌt ǀaŶ ‘oeƌŵuŶd, ͚Laǁ Without a “tate? OŶ ‘epƌeseŶtiŶg the CoŵŵoŶ Maƌket͛ iŶ 
Zenon Bankowski and Andrew Scott (eds.), The European Union and its Order: The Legal Theory of European 
Integration (Oxford: Blackwell/Wiley, 2000) 1; Bert Van Roermund, ͚“oǀeƌeigŶtǇ: UŶpopulaƌ aŶd Populaƌ,͛ in 
Neil Walker (eds.), Sovereignty in Transition. Essays in European Law (Oxford: Hart Publishing 2003) 33.  But see 
AlisoŶ YouŶg, ͚“oǀeƌeigŶtǇ: Deŵise, afteƌlife oƌ paƌtial ƌesuƌƌeĐtioŶ?͛ ;ϮϬϭϭͿ ϵ;ϭͿ I.CON 163, arguing that it 
requires a shift in focus from a definition of sovereignty in terms of law-making power to an analysis of 
sovereignty in terms of power over constitutive rules. See Jean Cohen, Globalization and Sovereignty 
Rethinking Legality, Legitimacy, and Constitutionalism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012).  
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frequently observed, especially across subject disciplines.
20
 Similarly, its tendency to raise the rule of 
ƌeĐogŶitioŶ ͚fiŶdeƌs tƌail͛ gaƌŶeƌs it little suppoƌt. The contestable and ͚aĐƌitiĐeƌial͛ nature of 
sovereignty is asserted as both a normative and descriptive standard, yet few accounts of 
sovereignty may be said to be truly preoccupied with the latter.
21
 As a result, sovereignty remains a 
stƌikiŶglǇ ŵalleaďle ͚ĐoŶstƌuĐt͛, ǁith ďƌoadeƌ appeal thaŶ its detƌaĐtoƌs suggest,22 despite assertions 
of its demise and futility.  It is argued that the meaning of sovereignty is open to change across time 
and space, more so than ever before.
23
 Others depict sovereignty as a common ground where the 
concerns of lawyers and political scientists can meet.
24
 The need for a conceptual framework for 
sovereignty to settle immediately a series of paradoxes often involving legitimacy and authority 
makes it no small task. The discursive nature of sovereignty can render it attractive to emergent 
polities, less so foƌ ͚deepeƌ͛ iŶtegƌatioŶ ŵeĐhaŶisŵs.  
The ĐlassiĐal ͚oƌthodoǆǇ͛, if oŶe ŵaǇ teƌŵ it that, is ǁell-put by Loughlin, reminding us that it is a 
relational interface between law and politics that separates and binds both domains together.
25
 
Nonetheless his assertions that the proliferation of new international institutions does not in any way 
necessitate a new form of sovereignty, whereby it remains undisturbed by international integration is 
argued here to be far from compelling.
26
 It does not engage with the enabling characteristics of 
postnational actors/ organisations and their participation in the global legal orders. It appears to this 
                                                          
20
 “ee Beth “iŵŵoŶs, ͚‘eǀieǁ EssaǇ: Is “oǀeƌeigŶtǇ still ‘eleǀaŶt͛ ;ϮϬϬϬͿ ϵϰ;ϭͿ American Journal of 
International Law 226, emphasising the distance between disciplines on the place of law in the global context. 
Similarly Cohen, ibid, adopts no specific definition of law in this account, despite the place of law and legality 
ǁithiŶ heƌ aĐĐouŶt. “ee NiĐk Baƌďeƌ, ͚The Afteƌlife of PaƌliaŵeŶtaƌǇ “oǀeƌeigŶtǇ͛ ;ϮϬϭϭͿ ϵ;ϭͿ I.CON 144. 
21
 See “aŵaŶtha BessoŶ, ͚“oǀeƌeigŶtǇ iŶ CoŶfliĐt͛ ;ϮϬϬϰͿ ϴ;ϭϱͿ European Integration Online Papers 1. Available 
at SSRN: <http://ssrn.com/abstract=594942> accessed 20 January 2015. 
22 
On its evolution, see Jens Bartelson, A Genealogy of Sovereignty (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
ϭϵϵϱͿ ϴϴ; QueŶtiŶ “kiŶŶeƌ, ͚The “oǀeƌeigŶ “tate: a GeŶealogǇ͛ iŶ  HeŶt Kalŵo aŶd QueŶtiŶ “kiŶŶeƌ ;eds.Ϳ, 
Sovereignty in Fragments: The Past, Present and Future of a Contested Concept (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2010). On constructivism, see Hans Lindahl, ͚“oǀeƌeigŶtǇ aŶd “ǇŵďolizatioŶ͛ ;ϭϵϵϳͿ Ϯϴ 
Rechtstheorie 347. 
23
 “ee JeŶs BaƌtelsoŶ, ͚The CoŶĐept of “oǀeƌeigŶtǇ ‘eǀisited͛ ;ϮϬϬϲͿ ϭϳ European Journal of International Law 
463. 
24
 Ibid. 
25
 Martin Loughlin, 'Ten Tenets of Sovereignty' in Neil Walker (eds.), Sovereignty in Transition (Oxford: Hart 
Publishing, 2003) 55. See Hans Lindahl, to the effect that it elaborates the contingent unity of a political 
ĐoŵŵuŶitǇ. “ee also HaŶs LiŶdahl, ͚WhǇ “oǀeƌeigŶtǇ?͛ iŶ ‘iĐhaƌd ‘aǁliŶgs, Peteƌ LeǇlaŶd & AlisoŶ YouŶg 
(eds.), Sovereignty and Law: Domestic, Regional & Global Perspectives (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013). 
26
 Because it is a foundational concept of the discipline of public law, see Loughlin, ibid 56. 
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author more compelling to argue as Keating does, that although sovereignty may be ebbing away, 
new sovereignty claims are being made all the time.
27
 For example, in the context of the EU, while 
theƌe ŵaǇ ďe Ŷo siŶgle EuƌopeaŶ deŵos, he pƌoposes iŶstead ͚pluƌiŶatioŶal deŵoĐƌaĐǇ͛, to loĐate 
democracy inter alia in communities of will.
28
 The openness of such a construction and its realist 
acceptance of the complex dual role of the EU alongside its Member States is worth reflecting on. 
The sovereign State is self-evidently unlikely to remain the only locus of political authority and 
community in the future but at the same time it remains a very potent, even tricky, source of 
authority and community.
29
 Nonetheless, there is one particularly valuable feature of sovereignty 
and that is its ability to form a lexicon for the transition of the world of sovereign states to a world 
where sovereignty has been relocated in many different levels, above and beyond the Nation State.
30
 
 BellaŵǇ͛s asseƌtioŶ of soǀeƌeigŶtǇ aŶd post-sovereignty as two sides of the one coin are argued to 
be particularly problematic in so far as he states that post-sovereignty views other forms of 
sovereignty as a threat to rights.  As he states, the EU certainly reflects the positive and negative 
aspects of the passage from sovereign to post-sovereign (promotion of liberal democracy versus the 
race to the bottom and/ or legitimacy challenges), as much as an awkward space between them, for 
eǆaŵple, the liŵited iŶtegƌatioŶ of the EU͛s AF“J. Hoǁeǀeƌ, otheƌs ĐoŶteŶd ǁith soŵe foƌĐe that the 
difficulty with post-sovereignty is its blindness to the epistemic as much as the normative role of 
sovereignty,  irrespective of what it is attached to.
31
 Rather, Besson has claimed, post-sovereignty 
fails to engage with the countless later claims to finalité that will arise. Yet there is something rather 
unpalataďle aďout aŶ asseƌtioŶ, as BessoŶ ŵakes, as to the ͚ĐoƌƌeĐt͛ use of soǀeƌeigŶtǇ, giǀeŶ the 
highly constructivist nature of sovereignty and its acknowledged contestability. It is constantly the 
                                                          
27
 Michael Keating, 'Sovereignty and Plurinational Democracy. Problems in political science' in Neil Walker 
(eds.), in Sovereignty in Transition (Oxford: Hart Publishing 2003) 191. 
28
 Keating ibid, 208. 
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 See Stephen D Krasner, Sovereignty. Organised Hypocrisy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999); 
Wouteƌ WeƌŶeƌ aŶd Jaap H de Wilde, ͚The EŶduƌaŶĐe of “oǀeƌeigŶtǇ͛ ;ϮϬϬϭͿ ϳ European Journal of 
International Relations 283.  
30
 Neil Walkeƌ, ͚The CosŵopolitaŶ LoĐal: Neil MaĐ CoƌŵiĐk͛s Post “oǀeƌeigŶ Woƌld͛ iŶ JohŶ EƌiĐ Fossuŵ aŶd 
Agustin Jose Mendedez (eds.), The Post-Sovereign Constellation (Springer, 2011). 
31
 See “aŵaŶtha BessoŶ, ͚“oǀeƌeigŶtǇ iŶ CoŶfliĐt͛ ;ϮϬϬϰͿ ϴ;ϭϱͿ European Integration Online Papers 1. Available 
at SSRN: <http://ssrn.com/abstract=594942> accessed 20 January 2015, 18. 
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subject and object of aggressive reinterpretation arising from globalisation, new claims to 
territoriality and the EU itself. Contrariwise, theorisations of its essential features by Besson by 
ŵeaŶs of ͚Đoopeƌatiǀe soǀeƌeigŶtǇ͛ suggest that its dǇŶaŵisŵ aŶd ƌefleǆiǀe-ness undermine her 
efforts to dichotomise the correĐt aŶd eǀeŶ ͚iŶĐoƌƌeĐt͛ use of soǀeƌeigŶtǇ.  Yet it is equally 
unsatisfactory or inadequate to settle on flexibility or malleability alone as the gold standard. These 
latter developments suggest distinct new challenges for sovereignty, for understanding for example, 
new layers of autonomous action.  
The compartmentalised debates on the force of the Nation State or new manifestations of 
sovereignty remain an enduring feature of this analysis. This leads to a more specific discussion on 
the place of the EU therein and its starting points and premises.   
 
ii. Sovereignty and EU exceptionalism 
EU scholarship on sovereignty begins from the premise of its exceptionalism as a construct. In the 
worlds of the greatest critics of claims of EU exceptionalism in discussions of sovereignty, the EU is 
inconsistent and contradictory as an entity- and not necessarily a straightforward model for an 
organisational representation of sovereignty.
32
 There is a dominance of tripartite formulations of 
sovereignty in EU law scholarship itself.
33
 For example, Chalmers suggests that sovereignty has been 
cast in three ways in the EU legal order. The first sees sovereignty as a series of activities which go to 
making up a domestic human order which transcends and constrains government, protected from EU 
law as it is a governmental order.
 34
 The second views sovereignty as something that ordains EU law 
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 “ee the tƌaŶsĐƌipt of the iŶteƌǀieǁ ǁith KƌasŶeƌ ͚“oǀeƌeigŶtǇ: aŶ iŶteƌǀieǁ͛, aǀailable at 
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(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), emphasising dualistic sovereignty as an optimum descriptor of 
contemporary global governance- i.e. the importance of the Nation State, without developing the relevance of 
law therein.  
34
 Damian Chalmers, European Restatements of Sovereignty LSE Law, Society and Economy Working Papers 
10/2013. 
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and grants it authority and retains the prerogative to patrol the democratic quality of EU law.
35
 The 
third argues that if EU government involves these bodies as most capable of expressing the will of 
this sovereign human order in its decision-making, it can enjoy sovereignty.
36
 However, overall, he 
aƌgues that the ͚geŶius aŶd follǇ of EU deďates oŶ soǀeƌeigŶtǇ lie iŶ theiƌ fluiditǇ͛. Yet theƌe is a 
tremendous gap concerning how cultural, geographic and geopolitical considerations come into play 
more broadly in non-European analyses of sovereignty.
37
 In a similar methodology, Besson outlines 
the three main camps within EU sovereignt-ists to be the national intergovernmentalists, the 
European supra-nationalists, both advocating unitary accounts of sovereignty and then the post-
sovereignt-ists.
38
 Such tripartite models used to explain and understand sovereignty demonstrate its 
flexible lexicon, its multi-faceted dimension and its constructability. Sovereignty theorisations remain 
awkwardly wedded to taxonomies of their content, usually tripartite ones, as if to reinforce its 
inherent intractability. Such tripartite analytical lens engage little with its exceptionalism despite 
operating from the assumptions thereof- and instead treat it as sui generis.  
Much scholarship on sovereignty and the EU has been developed prior to more recent invocations in 
the EU treaties to evolve as a postnational democracy. For example, for Krasner, the EU remains 
solely a product of sovereign States and as a sui generis organisation, he argues that it is not capable 
of replication or imitation. He appears fixed to the idea that the EU Member States have effective 
democratic sovereignty but not Westphalian sovereignty. For him, withdrawal of member States 
from the EU is a not viable option nor is a truly federalised United States of Europe- but this analysis 
begs the question as to its application to contemporary developments in the EU legal order.
39
 These 
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 Damian Chalmers, European Restatements of Sovereignty LSE Law, Society and Economy Working Papers 
10/2013, 3, citing Jens Bartelson, A Genealogy of Sovereignty (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995) 
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International Organisation 325, 350-355.  
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 See Antony Anghie, ͚‘ethiŶkiŶg soǀeƌeigŶtǇ iŶ iŶteƌŶatioŶal laǁ͛ ;ϮϬϬϵͿ ϱ Annual Review of Law and Society 
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TransState Working Papers 597 No 44, 1. See the historical account of Brendan Simms, Europe: The Struggle for 
Supremacy, from 1453 to the Present (Lane, 2013). 
38
 See “aŵaŶtha BessoŶ, ͚“oǀeƌeigŶtǇ iŶ CoŶfliĐt͛ ;ϮϬϬϰͿ ϴ;ϭϱͿ European Integration Online Papers 1. 
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innovations include withdrawal from the Union, a (postnational) democratic life of the Union, the 
development of formal legal coherence of EU action in the world by creating specific external 
ƌepƌeseŶtatioŶ iŶ the foƌŵ of the ;͚aĐtiǀelǇ͛ ŶaŵedͿ EuƌopeaŶ EǆteƌŶal AĐtioŶ “eƌǀiĐe, separate legal 
personality,
40
 and the ͚ĐoŶǀeŶtioŶalisation͛ of the most sensitive field traditionally guarded jealously 
by the Member States, the EU͛s AFSJ. It also precedes a vast range of legislative efforts to manipulate 
legal constructs so as to save the Eurozone through international agreements by the Member States, 
outside of the EU treaties and outside of EU accountability and legitimation structures.
41
 These 
developments demonstrate the weakness of postnational democracy as an ideal and its 
incompleteness, especially in the face of crisis.  
 
iii. The EU͛s late soǀereigŶty: the deǀelopŵeŶt of post soǀereigŶty  
 Walkeƌ͛s foƌŵula of late sovereignty as a development of postnational sovereignty merits further 
atteŶtioŶ heƌe. As Walkeƌ states, late soǀeƌeigŶtǇ is still soǀeƌeigŶtǇ. ͚Late “oǀeƌeigŶtǇ͛, iŶ his oǁŶ 
ǁoƌds ǁas ͚ďǇ ǁaǇ of a ƌetƌeat͛ fƌoŵ the assuŵptioŶs of ͚post-soǀeƌeigŶtǇ͛- which he explains as 
takiŶg effeĐt ͚ǁithout ƌetuƌŶiŶg to the oǆǇŵoƌoŶ͛s of disaggƌegatioŶ oƌ the ŵǇopia of the unitary 
appƌoaĐh͛.42  It conceives of sovereignty in terms of a plurality of unities and in terms of the 
emergent possibilities of the relationships amongst this pluƌalitǇ of uŶitǇ.  Foƌ Walkeƌ, ͚late 
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International Law Journal 165; Matthias ‘uffeƌt, ͚PeƌsoŶalitǇ uŶdeƌ EU Laǁ: A CoŶĐeptual AŶsǁeƌ toǁaƌds the 
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Đouƌts, pluƌal. A CasestudǇ of the EuƌopeaŶ “taďilitǇ MeĐhaŶisŵ͛ ;ϮϬϭϯͿ ϯϰ Michigan Journal of International 
Law Online  <http://mjilonline.org/?p=694> accessed 20 January 2015.  
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of Law Research Paper No 2013/14. Available at SSRN: <http://ssrn.com/abstract=2240941> accessed 20 
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Oxford University Press, forthcoming). 
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soǀeƌeigŶtǇ͛ is ĐhaƌaĐteƌised ǁith aŶ atǇpiĐal tǇpologǇ, ǁhiĐh iŶĐludes fundamental continuity over 
discontinuity, a distinctive phase in the career of the term, irreversibility, no way back to early 
sovereignty and transformative potential.  He maintains that it is distinctive in that the claim to 
authority flowing from it is no longer combined with the notion that it need be monopolistic, within 
the teƌƌitoƌial ďouŶdaƌies of the politǇ. The adǀaŶtage of ͚late soǀeƌeigŶtǇ͛ is that it eǆpliĐitlǇ 
captures new and supplementary tiers of transnationally connected legal and political authority. 
More significantly, is his acceptance of the possibility to conceive of autonomy without territorial 
exclusivity. Arguably the most pƌoďleŵatiĐ ĐƌiteƌioŶ theƌeof is the ͚Ŷo ǁaǇ ďaĐk͛ eleŵeŶt, Ŷoǁ 
defunct after the possibility of withdrawal from the Union being provided for in the Treaties.
43
 
Walkeƌ͛s defeŶĐe of the pƌeĐaƌiousŶess of late soǀeƌeigŶtǇ eŶĐoŵpasses ĐoŶfliĐt aŶd ďouŶdaƌǇ 
maintenance, diffusion of sovereign power and reflexivity and suggests a high degree of conceptual 
elasticity.
44
 For Walker, however, late sovereignty ultimately permits an organisation to flourish in a 
broad range of contexts. It offers a wide variety of mechanisms to understand participation in the 
global legal order. 
The present account would readily subscribe to later accounts of MacCormick, particularly on the 
nature of a kind of compendious legal external sovereignty exercised towards the rest of the world, 
written before innovations in the EU treaties on legal personality. They nonetheless appear to have 
featured significantly (implicitly) in his work in terms of their possible legal and political impact.
45
 The 
essence of the attractiveness of the formulation of MacCormick was that sovereignty had never been 
lost in the process of European integration. Politically, it had enhanced the action of its members 
collectively and perhaps even individually, in his assessment. Rather the process of division and 
combination had taken us beyond the sovereign state, albeit well beyond it.  
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It is argued here that those who contend that new and evolving international institutions do not 
necessitate a new conceptualisation of sovereignty, such as Loughlin, are unduly myopic to the 
challenge of postnational rule-making.
46
 Such a premise has been developed on the basis that 
sovereignty is the representation of autonomy of the political and provides the foundational concept 
for public law. Yet this same premise seems to fail to explicitly acknowledge changes in the nature of 
international organisations and the empirical rise of postnational rule-making.
47
 It is worth noting 
that for all of the provocation of critics of the EU specifically such as Krasner, they must be remarked 
to have a particularly limited perspective on the EU and not a particularly contemporary one. The 
nature of EU regulatory powers and their use, increasingly beyond their boundaries in law, practice 
and competence shows its limits. Nonetheless, its use thereof for the betterment of its subjects is 
significant in the context of its place as an aspirant postnational democracy. Similarly, the efforts of 
the EU to gain specific new statuses in international organisations is of significance. It is vivid 
evidence of active and participatory practice in the global legal order, even if esoteric.
48
 
 
III. The EU͛s partiĐipatioŶ toǁards the gloďal legal order 
i. Postnational rule-ŵakiŶg ǁith a goal of the ͚good life͛ 
The diffusion of higher standards, practices and the offer of the ͚good life͛49 and well-being for its 
peoples maybe said to represent the broadest premise of the EU as a new international organisation 
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and postnational democracy, albeit it is not the only premise of a postnational democracy.
50
 The 
same can be said for many places, countries and bodies or regimes predicated upon similar ideals yet 
which what might be said to fall short of a liberal democracy.
51
 More specifically, a central difficulty 
assoĐiated ǁith the deǀelopŵeŶt of the EU͛s AF“J, its most sensitive and evolving field but also the 
most closely associated with the Nation State in terms of offering justice, peace, security and overall 
well-being, is that it has evolved with considerably less coherence than desirable in its efforts to 
deepen cooperation, substantively and procedurally (e.g., procedural before the substantive, variable 
geometry, human rights instruments with specific or limited effects). It has occurred in a manner 
ǁhiĐh does Ŷot offeƌ its ĐitizeŶs the ďeŶefits of a ͚good life͛ oǀeƌall. The AFSJ has become so 
contested that its status as a policy field or mode of governance remains a contentious one.
52
 There 
aƌe also ŵaŶǇ ǁho pƌotest as to its justiĐe defiĐit ďut it is Ŷeǀeƌ stated to the effeĐt that the ͚good 
life͛ is jeopaƌdised.53 
The development of the AFSJ is a vivid reminder of the limitations of aspirations beyond the Nation 
State. Also constructions of the good life are too easily premised on the malleable boundaries of EU 
law. The rule-making toolkit of the EU to act as an innovative organisation are incredibly limited. 
Moreover, the construction of competence where it straddles classical internal market law and the 
AFSJ demonstrates how the EU has yet to carve out a sophisticated rule-making toolkit.  
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ii. Participation within the global legal order as a social practice  
Sovereignty is an inherently social concept in that it entails the recognition by other similar entities 
that aŶ eŶtitǇ is also ͚oŶe of theŵ͛.54 It thus implies a social relationship of formal equality.55  
Participation in the global legal order is a multi-faceted construct but is argued here to be rooted in 
an understanding the EU as an actor, i.e. what it is and what it does. This implies social recognition 
and understanding qua sovereign. Some such as Cohen have sought to refine the global legal order 
as an evolving political construct in terms of political participation, within a highly specific 
formulation of political rights as part of a constitutionalised version of the international system.
56
 
And such a thesis of constitutioŶalitǇ pƌesupposes a paƌtiĐulaƌ ǀieǁ aŶd defiŶitioŶ of ͚laǁ͛ iŶ that 
context. Theƌe is a hǇpothetiĐal Ǉet highlǇ ͚aĐtiǀe͛ ĐoŶteŶt to the ŵeasuƌeŵeŶt of soǀeƌeigŶtǇ as 
ƌegaƌds the EU. “oŵe ŵeasuƌe the loss of soǀeƌeigŶtǇ iŶ ͚ƌeal͛ ǀeƌsus ͚foƌŵal͛ teƌŵs of active 
participation in the global arena and this account draws from this as a point of reflection.
57
  
One such arena for analysis is Union participation in international organisations as a social practice, 
generating recognition, perception and acceptance. Internal legal order issues mostly dominate the 
question of Union participation in, for example, international organisations. The EU treaties provide 
permissively for participation in Article 218 TFEU, for UN participation in Article 220 TFEU and 
permissive third country and international organisation representation in Article 221 TFEU. The EU 
treaties are considerably more detailed as regards treaty negotiation and conclusion than as regards 
actual participation in international organisations. The EU treaties may be argued to have provided 
for an incomplete or open-ended legal construction of active participation in international 
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organisations.
58
 It is worth reflecting on the value that scholarship places on the EU treaties 
construction thereof. Legal scholarship appears to place a high premium on the ability of the EU to 
participate externally. It varies fƌoŵ ďeiŶg ͚iŵpeƌfeĐt͛ oƌ haǀiŶg ͚peƌsisteŶt shoƌtĐoŵiŶgs͛ to ďeiŶg 
open, flexible and permissive.
59
 The EU treaties maintain in fact a silence concerning the active social 
practices and conventions such as the right to participate or even to become a member of 
international organisations, not concerning itself with social activities such as discussion, cooperation 
or negotiation. Representation in international organisations between the institutions is often a 
source of conflict and may be governed by pragmatism, something which international relations 
scholars focus upon in greatest detail.
60
 While, foƌ eǆaŵple, the CoŵŵissioŶ͛s ƌole as Ŷegotiatoƌ has 
been endorsed in the treaties in Article 17 (1) TEU, there are clear exceptions for common foreign 
and securitǇ poliĐǇ. IŶstead, ǁhat is ƌefeƌƌed to as a ďiĐephal aƌƌaŶgeŵeŶt͛61 including the presence 
of Member States, the presidency of the EU and Commission has prevailed  in the OECD, the United 
Nations Conference on Trade and Development and the Socio-Economic Council of the United 
Nations. This can create external and internal problems- external, for third parties and internal, as 
between the rotating presidency and the Member States, who  (i.e. the latter) are compelled by this 
arrangement to listen and defer, i.e. remain silent.
62
 Here, the principle of sincere cooperation does 
not suffice and case law alone maybe insufficient to govern institutional inertia or turf-battles. Yet 
ambiguity in social and active practices is long tolerated as part of EU external relations law. 
A balanced and effective external representation may afford broad benefits to the EU. But it may be 
at the expense of circumscribing the actions of the institutions in external relations, often the 
Commission. As a result, some consider the distinction between a formal loss of sovereignty (for the 
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Member States) and a gain in terms of real sovereignty (for the EU Member States) as a dichotomy.
63
 
Yet it is a complex dichotomy to accept. Some posit a gain for the EU in the context of understanding 
how the EU can reform global governance.
64
 There are manifold assumptions, explicit and implicit, in 
such a thesis concerning the nature of actual and potential global influence through sovereignty. And 
examples from one context (e.g. the specificity of international economic law) may not be so easily 
transposed to another. Nevertheless, the enabling character of sovereignty at the postnational level 
arguably remains insufficiently studied. States can clearly enter, for example, international 
agreements or can set up new organisations or institutions, so long as it is without force. This 
͚ĐhaƌaĐteƌistiĐ͛ aŶd pƌaĐtiĐe is ŵoƌe ĐoŵŵoŶplaĐe outside of a doŵestiĐ oƌdeƌ ǁith a siŶgle 
hieƌaƌĐhǇ of authoƌitǇ. NoŶetheless, the ͚eŶaďliŶg͛ ĐoŵpoŶeŶt appeaƌs keǇ to the understanding of 
the formal loss and/ or gain of sovereignty. This question of enablement is an active one which 
requires considerable room for manoeuvre and the paper thus returns to consider this further detail. 
It reflects next on the formulation of the space for and of EU rules and the impact of EU rules 
externally. 
 
iii. The Physical and Metaphysical SpaĐe of EU ‘ules aŶd the ͚Gloďal 
ApproaĐh͛ to ‘ule-Making 
There are specific assumptions made in contemporary scholarship worth reflecting upon on the 
physical or territorial spaĐe of EU ͚eǆteƌŶal͛ ƌule-making, outside of the EU, vis a vis international law. 
It raises the question as to how it should impact on our understanding of EU rule-making and the 
EU͛s paƌtiĐipatioŶ iŶ the iŶteƌŶatioŶal legal oƌdeƌ. “oŵe offer reasons to explain the success of and 
reasons for the use of EU law instead of International law, including path dependence, geography, 
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ease of decision-making and the effectiveness of the EU.
65
 In this analysis, there is a normative 
assumption as to a physical gap between EU and International law as a regulatory choice in rule-
making. It presupposes that they are distinct rule-making processes and distinct forums capable of 
such a comparison which is not necessarily methodologically accurate.  
The external impact of the EU͛s ƌules, i.e. iŶ the ĐoŶteǆt of the metaphysical space for EU rules, is 
both a normative and descriptive challenge but it is a different question to EU law in place of 
International law as a regulatory choice. Yet it is a question which also flows from considering the 
space of EU rules.  Some such as Young have contended that the depiction of the EU as a global 
shapeƌ of ƌules has ďeeŶ aŶ eǆaggeƌated oŶe of iŶflueŶĐe, espeĐiallǇ iŶ liteƌatuƌe oŶ the EU͛s ƌegioŶal 
capacity, drawing extensively on literature on what the EU says and does rather than what it 
achieves.
66
 Young challenges the explicit assumption that the EU always seeks to export or upload EU 
regulatory solutions globally and instead pursues a more relative regulatory solution overall. 
However, as a proposition it requires more nuancing not least from a legal perspective. 
 It is iŶĐƌeasiŶglǇ ĐoŵŵoŶ foƌ the EU to haƌďouƌ ͚gloďal goǀeƌŶaŶĐe͛ goals ǁith its thiƌd ĐouŶtƌǇ 
partners- for example, the aims of the EU-US Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), 
aiming for global standards, similar to the EU-US Cybercrime and Security negotiations, also aiming 
foƌ gloďal staŶdaƌds as aŶ outĐoŵe ďut aƌguaďlǇ diffeƌiŶg soŵeǁhat fƌoŵ the ͚gloďal appƌoaĐh͛ to 
AFSJ data transfer, as depicted here. Also it may be both over-inclusive and inaccurate to depict the 
EU͛s ƌule-ŵakiŶg ǁhiĐh has iŵpliĐatioŶs, effeĐts aŶd foƌĐe outside of its teƌƌitoƌǇ as ͚gloďal͛ ƌule-
making per se, thereby formulating the rule-making in territorial terms.
67
 Descriptions of the 
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(regulatory) impact of the EU often do appear to overstate its influences, possess different 
understandings of what is regulatory impact. It also is easy to neglect outlining instances where the 
EU did not exercise regulatory influence.
68
 However, as a broader proposition, the space of EU rules 
is argued here to require more nuancing, method and study as to its components, especially in the 
context of the AFSJ. In short there are as many methodological as substantive challenges to such a 
thesis, which this text has sought to address as part of a research agenda. 
This leads to the question of the construction of boundaries and transboundaries, which this paper 
considers in further detail. 
 
iv. Transboundary control and EU law  
While there has been a charted empirical explosion in the late 20
th
 Century in the number of so-
Đalled ͚tƌaŶsŶatioŶal͛ Đases aƌisiŶg, ǁheƌe ŶatioŶal laǁs are applied extra-territorially, to attempt to 
tǇpologise Đategoƌies of ĐoŶtƌol as it ŵaŶifests itself iŶ ͚tƌaŶsďouŶdaƌǇ͛ aĐtioŶ- descriptively or 
normatively- is a steep challenge.
69
 It reflects the enduring relevance of boundaries as interests for 
political ends. Extra-territorial laws have been argued to be a necessary impetus to spur negotiations 
and provide incentives to cooperate internationally.
70
  
In this regard, territoriality and extra-territoriality are and seem likely to remain legal constructs 
defined traditionally by claims to and resistance from authority. As Buxbaum states, the essence of 
such claims to authority is that particular actors usually wish to promote specific substantive 
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interests.
71
 As a result, practical, but mainly political questions inevitably dominate these constructs. 
As Lindahl has argued persuasively, no legal order is in reality thinkable absent boundaries in space, 
tiŵe, suďjeĐtiǀitǇ aŶd ĐoŶteŶt, eǀeŶ if aƌe ǀaƌious foƌŵs of ͚alegalitǇ͛.72  This is because legal 
boundaries join and separate within the unity of a legal order.
73
 This does not necessarily meet the 
challenge of the postnational level where one witnesses a specific reconfiguration of directions of 
authority.  
The phenomenon of the EU leveraging its rule-making outside of its territory has been depicted 
ǀaƌiouslǇ as ͚teƌƌitoƌǇ eǆteŶsioŶ͛ oƌ ͚ĐouŶteƌ-teƌƌitoƌialitǇ͛.74 Yet the tƌaditioŶal ͚tƌiuŵǀiƌate͛ of 
sovereignty, territory and jurisdiction conventionally used to theorise borders of laws is arguably of 
little use in the conceptualization of much contemporary conduct of the EU.
75
 Instead, the globalised 
world of trans-boundary conduct and overlapping jurisdiction suggests that these three elements 
merge more frequently.
76
 That EU law should similarly reflect this is not surprising. Moreover, the 
conduct of the EU externally as a legal actor is not necessarily unitary and instead its actors remain 
non-unitary. Thus, to assert that the EU acts unilaterally so as to expand its territory has been argued 
heƌe Ŷot to gƌasp the stƌuĐtuƌal iŶdiƌeĐtŶess of the EU͛s ƌule-transfer. This point is neatly 
deŵoŶstƌated ďǇ ƌeĐalliŶg “Đott͛s aƌguŵeŶt as to ͚Teƌƌitoƌial eǆteŶsioŶ͛ of EU laǁ,77 who proposes 
͚teƌƌitoƌǇ eǆteŶsioŶ͛ as a ;positiǀeͿ pheŶoŵeŶoŶ of EU ƌule-making beyond its territory, without 
necessarily addressing the authority or legitimacy of this endeavour of postnational rule-making. One 
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may note how few legal theorisations of the EU develop extra-territoriality or territorial extension 
from the premise of broader theorisations of conduct and necessity, for example, cosmopolitanism, 
so as to justify moral, ethnic or other legal duties outside of its territory.
78
 From the perspective of 
sovereignty, there is something unsatisfactory about constructing territorial extension alone as a 
(quasi)normative standard, if it is that at all, because of the failure to engage with the blurring of 
sovereignty, authority and territory therein.   
 
IV. Concluding Reflections: On manifestations of sovereignty   
 
This paper has sought to place of sovereignty in the context of postnational rule-making and to 
consider the exceptionalism of EU sovereignty. Postnationalism is more accurately a broader 
methodology to study shifts in norms, actors and processes and fits well with the task of unpacking 
the global reach and effects of EU law. It has been argued here that those who argue that new and 
evolving international institutions do not necessitate a new conceptualisation of sovereignty are 
unduly myopic to the challenge of postnational rule-making. EU scholarship on sovereignty begins 
from the premise of its exceptionalism. However, much scholarship on sovereignty and the EU has 
been developed prior to more recent invocations in the EU treaties to evolve as a postnational 
democracy.  
 
Sovereignty as an inherently social concept entails the recognition by other similar entities that an 
eŶtitǇ is also ͚oŶe of theŵ͛. This iŵplies soĐial ƌeĐogŶitioŶ aŶd uŶdeƌstaŶdiŶg of aĐtoƌs. PaƌtiĐipatioŶ 
by the EU in the global legal order is a multi-faceted construct but is argued here to be rooted in an 
understanding the EU as an actor, i.e. what it is and what it does.  Legal scholarship appears to place 
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a high premium on the ability of the EU to participate externally as an actor, seamlessly, coherently 
and with consistency. Accordingly, as has been argued here, the enabling character of sovereignty at 
the postnational level appears insufficiently studied. 
 
